Chapter 4. ‘Parallel Power’ in Rio de Janeiro: Coercive Mediators and the Fragmentation of Citizenship in the Favela

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Introduction

Mediation is in part a reflection of the nature of the relationship between the favela and the contemporary Brazilian state, which has a particular historical character. In Rio, armed actors have come to act as mediators as a result of their position within the favela, which has evolved alongside the favela-state relationship. The current constitution, ratified in 1988, marked the end of more than 20 years of military dictatorship, and expanded considerably the number of rights and the concept of citizenship in Brazil set out by the 1934 Vargas Constitution (Kingstone 2000). Beyond the rights set out in the constitution, the document also marks an important shift in the mode of interaction between the state and citizens, as it also heralded the rise of formally instituted citizen participation through consultative councils at different levels of government (Coelho 2004; Cornwall and Coelho 2007). There is a significant body of research that examines the effectiveness and dynamics of these participatory mechanisms, including participatory budgeting, health councils and environmental councils. Brazil’s attempts at participatory democracy have attracted global attention.

Most recently, a series of centre left presidents have developed a series of extensive social protection programmes (Almeida 2005). This represents a trend towards the greater recognition by the state of the need to strengthen economic and social rights (Menino, Shankland et al. 2011). The drive towards reducing the persistent social and economic inequalities in Brazil, has coincided with the entrenchment of formal mechanisms for citizen participation across a range of sectors of public policy, as described above. Taken together, these two trends reflect the current nature of state-civil society relations which Menino, Shankland et al. (2011) summarise as:

…the dynamics of an unconventional democracy, one sustained on the uneasy balance between stable, democratic institutions on one side and unattended demands on the other; a stable democracy in which vivid participatory institutions, a modern set of laws, diverse formal channels of interaction and a strongly and diversely mobilised civil society live side by side with a government that is merely partially responsive; a democracy in which the state’s response to claims remains limited, while CSOs remain largely non-violent and trustful of the institutional channels of negotiation.

This analysis of the co-evolution of state-society relations and the changing nature of citizenship for residents of favelas does not fully take into account how the rising levels of violence are also negatively affecting the nature of citizen-state relations and democracy in Brazil, and how the state’s use of violence undermines its efforts to advance rights in other areas (Holston 2009). Little research has been done to understand how the significant levels of violence in different parts of the country
limit the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms and mechanisms of deliberative democracy. This chapter argues that violence shapes forms of mediation that inform how the state appears to citizens, and how citizens see their citizenship and make claims on the state. Such an understanding of how violence affects citizenship, particularly how violence fragments citizenship for citizens of the favelas, is necessary in order to understand the quality of democracy in this context.

With relatively high levels of violence in parts of Rio de Janeiro over a prolonged period of time, drug trafficking groups have become one of the dominant actors in these communities. According to the Instituto de Segurança Pública, over 39,000 people have been killed in the war between drug trafficking groups, the military police, and para-statal death squads from 2007 to 2013, with a further 35,000 people disappeared in the same period (Rio da Paz 2013). The consequence of this violence is that ‘cultural constructions of violence as normal have been maintained and transformed in a range of contemporary urban contexts, with the result that an increasingly complex web of institutions, groups and individuals is involved in the perpetration of everyday violence’ (Winton 2004: 169).

The rise of the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro (Dowdne 2003), and the accompanying wars for control of the favelas contribute to an environment where the state is far from being the most powerful actor, and the ability of any part of the government to change this situation is limited. Since the 1980s most favelas have been dominated by drug trafficking gangs (traficantes), who have taken advantage of the dearth of state presence in favelas to establish a highly complex structure for the distribution and re-sale of drugs, primarily cocaine and marijuana. Prior to 2004, traficantes from one of three major factions controlled all but one favela in Rio de Janeiro. These factions are often war with one another for control over the lucrative drug sale and distribution points. In 2005, groups of men armed with police equipment began to invade and take control over favelas, expelling or killing those associated with the drug trafficking faction, and suppressing open drug trade (Bottari and Ramalho 2006; Ramalho 2006; Torres 2006).

These ‘militias’, as the media has labelled them, are made up of a mixture of off-duty, retired, or suspended police officers (military and civil), prison guards, firemen, and civilians. Within 18 months of taking over the first favela in 2004, the militias controlled nearly 171 communities across the city (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 45). The militia retain close ties with the official police, often using weapons and vehicles from police depots for their ‘operations’, and communicating with the official police on a regular basis (Bottari and Ramalho 2006; Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008). In most cases, the militia extort money from the community through a variety of means backed by threats of violence, from beatings and torture to execution (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 44). This chapter will consider the role of these armed actors as mediators.

**Mediators and forms of mediation**
Important mediators within the context of the favela include political party machinery, police, militia, drug trafficking gangs, community-based organisations (non-violent) including resident’s associations, social programmes instigated by external actors (such as the Catholic church, NGOs), religious organisations, and other influential individuals who may have connections to more than one of these mediating institutions. These can be categorised in several ways. First, there is a distinction to be made between informal and formal mediators. Formal mediators have legal recognition for their role and act as formally constituted organisations such as political parties and NGOs. Informal mediators are neither legally recognised nor institutionalised. This argument plays out in an interesting way to the context of the favela. For example, a woman in Quitungo won a case in the employment tribunal, where she was awarded payment for wages and benefits that were not paid in a previous job. Yet on a daily basis she faces insecurity and fear and must negotiate her life within this context, despite a justice system established by the state that was able to uphold her labour rights (Tiana 2006). These examples explored here show how mediators control how people in the favela move between informal and formal institutions in order to make claims for their rights.

A second distinction centres on the basis for authority: coercive or non-coercive. Coercive mediators use violence or the threat of violence as their primary source of authority. Coercive mediation differs from the client/patron arrangement in both depth and scope. The extent of the influence of coercive mediators is further than a traditional client/patron arrangement because they rely on the use of, or the threat of, the use of violence. The scope of the relationship is also different because residents have no option but to interact with the mediator and there is very little or no scope for negotiation. They cannot opt for a relationship with a different actor to access the same things. In a classic client/patronage relationship, such as the political party machinery, the client expects certain benefits from the relationship with the patron in exchange for political support (see Scott 1972; Kaufman 1974; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Gay 2006). However, the client can switch allegiances and enter into another arrangement with a different patron if they are not satisfied.

More recent political science literature points to the importance of what Houtzager and Archaya call informal brokerage as a type of citizenship practice (through political or authoritarian clientelism) (Fox 1994; Taylor 2004; Gay 2006; Houtzager and Archarya 2009). However, the mediating actors in the favela are more than informal brokers or patrons. In this case, community residents have no option but to negotiate with the mediating actors because they are armed and use violence as the basis for their authority. The option of switching allegiances to another ‘patron’ is either not a possibility at all, or a very dangerous one. The mediating actors differ from the client/patron model because both community residents and external actors (such as government agencies, NGOs, public services) must interact with the mediating actors, who act as gatekeepers for access ‘to’ and ‘from’ the community.

Space for negotiation with mediators exists, but is much more limited than with a client/patron relationship. Negotiation occurs within the boundaries stipulated by the hard boundaries of the violence that hovers in the background to all interactions.
This coercion is based on violence and the threat of violence and is not always obvious. Coercion can be linked to hidden forms of power, embedded in the collective memory of past violence (Gaventa 1982). While coercive mediators may act according to typical clientelistic patterns, there is always the threat of going beyond that through the use of violence. In sum, while there are multiple forms of mediation at work in the favela, the focus in this chapter is on coercive informal mediators because, empirically, they are the most influential. Although many types of mediation co-exist within the favelas, the domination of the informal/coercive mediators means that they sanction the remaining mediators and often push out other formal and non-coercive mediators.

The table below outlines some of the most important mediating actors within the favelas, and describes what they mediate access to and how, drawing on the examples explored above.

**Table 1: Mediating actors in the favela**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediating actor</th>
<th>Type(s) of mediation</th>
<th>What they mediate access to</th>
<th>Purpose of mediation</th>
<th>Source(s) of authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>Informal, coercive</td>
<td>Distribution of services (gas, electricity, internet, pirate cable), security, real estate transactions, some community-based organisations including residents' associations, weapons, livelihoods for young men</td>
<td>Exorting money from transactions, suppressing open drug trade, reducing violence from warring factions, providing security</td>
<td>Violence, reputation in community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking factions</td>
<td>Informal, coercive</td>
<td>Security, some community based organisations including residents' associations, weapons, drugs, livelihoods for young men</td>
<td>Guaranteeing sympathetic environment for drug trade (i.e. complicit silence of residents), building a base for bigger operations and control of additional communities</td>
<td>Violence, reputation in community, personal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Formal, coercive</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Exorting money from militia and factions (in some cases), providing</td>
<td>Violence, legal status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>security (in some cases)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Church groups</td>
<td>Formal, informal, non-violent</td>
<td>Maintaining base of political power, addressing poverty and social exclusion</td>
<td>Moral authority, history in community, controls access to benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of government benefits (Bolsa Familia, Cheque Cidadão, milk vouchers), crèche, recycling programme</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party machinery</td>
<td>Formal, informal, non-violent</td>
<td>Gaining and maintaining political power, making money, addressing social exclusion</td>
<td>Political legitimacy, influence over government allocations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of government services, jobs through political appointments (cargo de confianza)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community based organisations (non-violent)</td>
<td>Informal, formal, non-violent</td>
<td>Addressing social exclusion, gaining political power, making money</td>
<td>Moral authority, history in the community, personal relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of government benefits, access to social programmes</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, it is the coercive mediators, who rely on violence, that have the biggest impact on people’s lives, dictating access to a whole range of services. Of these, the militia is perhaps one of the most important, as militias are relatively new occurrences across Rio. In the case of the militia, there are several levels of mediation between citizens at the community level and the government. Citizens must negotiate with the militia, who in turn are negotiating the remit of their authority with the police, which is in turn negotiating its authority with the government. In some respects, it is easier for community leaders to make demands on the government when there is a drug trafficking faction in control, as long as the faction is not extremely brutal, because citizens can negotiate directly with the government, circumventing the factions, if community-based organisations are established enough to maintain their independence. In the case of the militias, no such possibility exists.

**Examples of mediation: social mobilisation and security**

This section will examine how examples of mediation play out in practice by looking at how mediators determine how residents are able to mobilise at the community level and how residents get access to security. These examples show the complexity of mediating relationships and the way that these bound people’s lives on a daily basis, but also how mediators enable access to rights and services. The analysis of
mediation in these cases sheds light on how mediation contributes to the fragmentation of citizenship.

Social mobilisation

Social mobilisation at the community level is a difficult and often dangerous undertaking. Mediators often play an important role in social mobilisation, in both facilitating and stifling it. It is worth noting that not all social mobilisation is to the benefit of the community, or contributes to more participatory and democratic processes. Both the trafficking factions and the militia are highly organised and effective examples of social mobilisation with questionable benefits for the community. The scope of this research did not include a detailed examination of these types of social mobilisation. Instead, it focused on types of social mobilisation that intend to reduce social exclusion and inequalities.

In Quitungo and Guaporé, social mobilisation and non-violent community-based organisations have been considerably weakened and undermined by the past 15 years of extreme levels of violence. The head of the residents’ association describes a classic and pervasive pattern of patronage politics that persists within many parts of Rio de Janeiro, where voting blocks are controlled by specific gatekeepers who bargain with political candidates for support in exchange for concessions (see Gay 2006; McCann 2006; Arias 2007). This is like a type of currency that community leaders can trade in, when dealing with external actors or with other mediators within the community:

I’ve been here for a long time before the militia turned up. A lot of people are against the militia, but we speak out against them. We need money to make social projects work, but people give up because they are afraid. People refuse to participate, but that doesn’t mean that they accept the situation. We constantly make requests to the government, but they never have any projects for us. We had Project Honey here from Rosinha [a municipal councillor], but she pulled it out. Now Cabral has come to power and if I wanted to get any projects from his government, I would need to join his party and work for at least a year or two (Cesário 2007).

A former president of a residents’ association explained how this patronage system worked in the last election:

We managed 700 votes for our candidate, Robson [head of the militia] got 300 for his, someone else managed 200 for theirs and so on. With these 700 votes, we will be the last to be helped—after the communities that managed 3000, 1500, and so on (Cesário 2007).

Fear of reprisals is another aspect of how this mediation limits social mobilisation:
There was a woman who had a CBO, and she taught English classes and other things. But she got involved in the business of the bandidos and they closed down her CBO (Alcir/Tiana, field diary, 19 December 2006).

People are afraid of becoming publicly aligned against the militia—the risks associated with this emerged strongly in the research (Wheeler 2012). It also shows how this form of mediation within the favela is juxtaposed over client/patron structures politically connected to the state. At the same time that people are afraid of becoming involved publicly, social mobilisation is limited by traditional patronage, where politicians require a certain number of votes to deliver resources. A more in-depth example reinforces these points.

In June 2007 the Pan-American Games were held in Rio de Janeiro. The Federal government sponsored a programme of civic guides, where children from favelas were trained to act as guides to Brazil’s history, culture, traditions, and Rio de Janeiro’s tourist attractions. Children were chosen from the favelas closest to the sites of the Games. For murky reasons related to political patronage, Quitungo and Guaporé were included in the programme, even though they are not near the sites of the Games. The person appointed to head the programme in Quitungo and Guaporé, Marilsa, has connections with senior politicians in the Federal government, as well as the city and state governments. For example, she was responsible for distributing the Cheque Cidadão in Quitungo. She is relatively well educated and affluent for Quitungo (she owns a car, owns her own property, her husband works in a formal job).

Despite these relatively high profile connections (which she demonstrates by showing photographs of herself with senior politicians), Marilsa was not able to independently mobilise children to fill the slots for the programme. She needed fifty children who would commit to attending training courses run by the government including visits outside of the community. She asked Alcir, one of the community researchers and community leader who has run a percussion and music school for children for 20 years in Quitungo, to ‘provide the children for the programme’. According to Alcir, Marilsa wanted him ‘to provide the children for her programme, so that she can go to Brasilia and claim the credit for these children’s accomplishments.’ Alcir has the capacity to mobilise a significant number of children because of his work with music and percussion with them. He can ‘provide’ children who fit the requirements of the programme, assuring her that they are not involved in the trafficking. While he resented Marilsa taking the credit for his own capacity for mobilisation, he also wanted to pass on the opportunity to the children he worked with. However, when the militia learned of this programme, they sent the message via intermediaries that they would be sending a certain number of children on the programme as well. These would be boys or girls who had some involvement in the militia, or whose parents were involved. They also sought to ban any children they perceived as having links to the trafficking factions from the programme.

Once the struggles over who would be invited to participate were resolved, the issue over where the training courses would be held arose. During the time of the
research project, the courses were moved several times as the militia took over residents’ association buildings. Marilsa eventually settled for a church building in the favela, although some parents did not want their children attending an event in a rival denomination’s building. The militia also had to agree to buses being sent to the favela for the children to attend the external events. Marilsa was confident that she could fend off attempts by the militia to intervene because of her connections with senior federal politicians (whereas connections with state or municipal politicians are less beneficial because of the sway of the militia with the local police forces and politicians).

This is an example of a small-scale social mobilisation. From the outset, for even a small opportunity for a small number of children, various mediators are involved in determining who participates and who benefits. The web of different mediators determines which children become involved with this programme, where the training sessions are held, and the terms of the participation of the children. Community leaders such as Alcir and Marilsa trade on their ability to mobilise specific groups (20 young people for this government programme, 30 elderly people for this church programme, a certain number of voters for this candidate). In the case of this social mobilisation that aims to reduce social exclusion, there is a mixture of forms of mediation—between clientelism, paternalism, and coercion. This is a pattern repeated in other favelas, with drug trafficking factions and militias, and leads to a weakening of the basis for non-violent community-based organisations (McCann 2006, Arias 2007). Non-violent community leaders also act as mediators—and not all mediation is negative with respect to establishing more democratic relations. The question is how violence leads to different types of mediation, and the wider issue of how particular patterns of authority become replicated, in part through these practices of mediation. As these examples also show, it is difficult to achieve a paradigm shift towards democratic practices from these patterns (see Wheeler 2012).

This example shows how sustaining social mobilisation, traditionally understood, is difficult in the context of coercive mediators. Fundamentally, the mediators in each case limit or alter the state’s ability to intervene within the favela, as the example of the benefits to children is mediated by who can participate, where, etc. In terms of acting as an intermediary between citizens and the state, the militia controls how social mobilisation from within the favela can interface with the state and how this mobilisation is made legible to the state. The militia intermediates agency within the favela through controlling how mobilisation occurs (e.g. setting the location for meetings, trying to determine who can participate and controlling whether buses can collect children from within the community). The militia uses this control over social mobilisation to try and gain greater legitimacy and formal recognition for their role. Non-violent community leaders also act as mediators, and the state seeks them out in this role, as in the case of the distribution of welfare benefits. But the state must negotiate their relationship with armed actors as well. This raises the question of how social action is linked to violence.

Security
Armed actors control who has access to security and how that security is delivered within the favelas. This is directly related to the prospects for citizenship and legitimate political authority. Attempts by citizens to claim the right to security clearly expose the role of coercive mediators, as virtually all such claims are made to the mediators and not to the state. Both the way that police operations happen within the favela and the ways that citizens access their security is controlled by coercive mediators.

Excluded groups in Rio de Janeiro are faced with extremes of insecurity and safety in favelas and other marginalised communities. The levels of insecurity and the pervasiveness of the effects of violence within these communities are juxtaposed with the relative safety and state-control in other parts of the city where many residents of favelas work. At the same time, across Brazil’s cities, large parts of the middle class have retreated into fortified complexes, seeking to isolate themselves from the threat of violence and the social processes that seem beyond their control (Caldeira 1999). In conjunction with the increasing spatial stratification of security, there is a growing privatisation of security. Middle class residents hire private security forces to protect their property and ensure their safety, while security in favelas is often both enforced and violated by trafficking groups.

In addition to this highly differentiated geography of safety and danger, particular events within the favela could also precipitate a different set of security arrangements. For example, if there was going to be an invasion or other armed action by the traffickers or the militia, they would inform certain key community leaders and the community would be shut down—people stay inside, shops and businesses close, schools close, and the streets empty. In some cases, this message is communicated publicly (field dairy 2006):

‘Resident: today, access to the favela only until 17:00. Shoot out at 17.30’
--A warning written by drug traffickers in Morro da Vidigal

This phenomenon is frequent enough that it has had an impact on primary and secondary education (Leeds 2007). In a recent wave of violence in November 2010, 159 schools were closed in and near favelas affecting 38,566 students (Veja 2010). This is a regular consequence of the violence. Beyond this, there is also a clear set of rules bounding the use of public space. Certain public spaces are claimed by the traffickers and/or the militia as their ‘bases’, or for their specific activities. Other public spaces are then available for commerce, meetings by community groups, etc. Because public space itself is quite scarce in most favelas, the control of what public space there is becomes a significant source of power. It also acts to restrict social mobilisation because any community leader or external politician who wants to initiate public meetings must negotiate for the physical space to do so with the militia or traffickers. Finding a neutral public space that is not under the control of a faction or the militia is virtually impossible. If a community group uses a public space controlled by one of the violent mediators, then there is the risk that if a surprise
Invasion occurs, any participants in those activities will become causalities of the violence.

In addition to controlling the boundaries of safe and unsafe, the militias and the trafficking factions also control who enters and exits the community. Individuals and families can be banished by the factions or the militias as punishment for association with a rival group. A cycle of banishment and exodus accompanies every change of faction (field diary, 17 January 2007). When a new faction or the militia take control, those most closely linked with the previous donos (local heads of factions) will be forced to leave or be killed. When the militia took over Quitungo, all of the children that had been involved with the drug trafficking were banished to the favelas (Piquiri or Divinea). This meant that the children were living on the street or sleeping with different relatives every night, because they could not return to the housing estate (Suelí 2006; Tiana 2006).

Despite this tight control over the physical space of the communities, at times the violence becomes unpredictable—for example when the police, another militia, or a trafficking faction invades with no warning. It is these unpredictable episodes of violence that lead to the greatest sense of precariousness, fear, and insecurity for residents. When events conform to the security regime imposed by the controlling actor, the levels of security and public safety can be generally quite high. But the uncertainty that at any time a total inversion of these rules can take place by an armed group, entering and killing indiscriminately colours all the interactions in public spaces.

When citizens in favelas want to make claims for improved security, these claims must be made to the coercive mediators that control the favelas. With the exception of the minority of favelas occupied by the Police Pacification Units (UPPs), state institutions do not control security at the level of the favela nor do they respond to claims for improved security from citizens in the favela. Despite the high levels of violence in favelas, the issue of security is not anarchic. On the contrary, the provision of security and the enforcement of certain rules imposing a type of public order are taken very seriously by both the militias and the trafficking factions in areas they control. In fact, of all the dimensions of daily life in the favela, it is the physical security of people where the coercive mediators have the most impact.

During participatory discussion sessions in Quitungo, research participants mapped areas of safety and danger in their community. Specific areas were clearly delineated on the community maps as violent and dangerous. These mappings were considered so sensitive by the residents that they did not want them to be kept in the favela. They insisted that I store them at my flat in Rio de Janeiro and take them back to the United Kingdom at the end of the research.

Figures 1-3: Participatory maps of communities and violence (excluded from Chapter Preview)
These were the areas where the sale of drugs and weapons occurred, where executions or torture would occur, and where shoot-outs would frequently happen. In the places where drugs and weapons are bought and sold (known as the ‘boca de fumo’), residents cannot enter during the hours of darkness without being involved in the trafficking. In some more extreme cases, this ban extended into daytime hours when a faction that was in control expanded the period of trafficking each day. When the militias took over Quitungo and Guaporé, they installed gates and barriers at the main entrances to the communities. Over time these have been augmented and fortified to include a cement wall along one side of the community, echoing the gated communities of the middle class. The militias use these physical barriers to control the flow of people in and out of the communities, charging R$10 for the right to enter and exit per month per resident in Guaporé.

The militias and factions are also involved in establishing a system of informal justice within the favela to govern security arrangements (Santos 2002). As municipal councillor, Andrea Gouvêa, said at a policy debate on 5 June 2009: ‘The defining characteristic of a favela is that it is a place where the justice is not delivered by the state.’ Under this system, certain crimes and forms of violence are punished in certain instances (such as rape and domestic violence).

My research shows how people who engage in any kind of public action have to negotiate for space and the security to carry out these activities (e.g. suspending literacy classes when ordered to do so by the faction/militia, etc). Talking to the police, a member of militia or drug trafficking faction can be interpreted as a political act that jeopardises not only the individual’s security, but also that of their family. Residents are not allowed (or are not willing) to report the actions of the militia to the state authorities. This was demonstrated by the low number of calls to the hotline set up by the state government on the militias (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008). Beyond this, the implications of this control of security is a kind of closing down within the community—a sense that whatever happens within the community stays there and must be resolved there without any external intervention. This is echoed in people’s perceptions of citizenship and participation, which are highly referent to the community. But also throughout the research, at participatory sessions, interviews and informal interactions, was a sense of isolation—that no one from the state or another external actor could really intervene at the basic level of security.

At a very fundamental level, armed actors control access to security within the favela. The militia acts as the intermediary between the police and residents, taking control of how they are able to interact with each other: ‘I don’t want the residents’ association mixed up with the police. They [community residents] have to come talk to me’ (Robson, field diary, 21 November 2006). They also connect the demands for greater security with their own regime and pattern of authority to institute security
on their terms. They set boundaries within the community and they control the frontier between the communities and the rest of the city. This has obvious impacts on the resident’s daily lives, but it also affects other activities within the community from education to commerce to social mobilisation. The control of the militia as mediators of security is almost totally pervasive within the favela, to the extent that they exert more control than the police (or other state institutions), or citizen groups over how security is delivered. On this most fundamental aspect of life, security, it is the militias and the factions who are in control. They intermediate agency between citizens and the state in the sense that the militia or the drug factions themselves address the demands from residents for greater security, and the ability of the state to overturn these arrangements is very limited. Any state interventions must either negotiate with coercive mediators (as in the case of upgrading and infrastructure projects explored below), or they must eliminate them (as in the case with police raids, and the current policy of occupation). In either case, in their role as providers of security, the militia also position themselves as the formal protectors and leaders of the community and their ability to provide security is integral to this.

Conclusion

Violence shifts the basis for mediation and weakens access to rights

While informal, coercive mediators hold the greatest sway in the favelas of Rio, there are other mediators and other forms of mediation at work as well as other democratic processes of representation and participation. Other research has focussed extensively on these other forms of mediation and how they related to democratic practice including the way that democratic and clientelistic practices are hybridised (Taylor and Wilson 2004; Gay 2006; Piper and von Lieres 2011). However the issue of how violence shifts these forms of mediation has not been adequately explored. It is the coercive mediators and the way that they are very present in many areas of daily life, from access to basic services to education, to processes of social mobilisation that underlines their importance in terms of the relationship between citizens and the state. They shift the mode of interaction with the state, making democratic relationship of accountability unviable, and also curtail the sense of political community, limiting it to the geographical boundaries of the area that they control.

This study demonstrates how mediating actors and institutions can weaken citizenship status (Burgos 2005). In terms of gaining access to basic rights, residents of the favelas negotiate through overlapping and contradictory forms of mediation that bring together elements of coercive, clientelistic, paternalistic and democratic practices. As demonstrated in Wheeler (2012), citizenship concerns both the relationship between the individual/community and the state, and also the sense of identity and belonging that help constitute the boundaries of political community. Mediation shifts both of these axes of citizenship. It shifts the relationships between individuals and the state by directly intervening in how people can make claims and how the state can respond. It shifts the boundaries of political community by creating and sustaining new and narrower boundaries that are geographically
specific to the area controlled by the mediators, reinforcing the way that violence closes horizons (Wheeler 2012).

*Violence entrenches mediators and makes them difficult to challenge*

The chapter has demonstrated how the space for shifting the control of coercive mediators or negotiating with them is limited. The creation of certain alliances opens possibilities for change. But other configurations of forces can stifle social action aimed at undermining repressive and unaccountable power structures by subverting government programmes and other external intervention through mediating these relationships in a way that reinforces unaccountable forms of power and legitimacy, particularly in the case of security. The lack of accountability of state institutions, such as the military police, reinforces the position of the mediators as those who are able to achieve results.

*Coercive mediation and fragmented citizenship*

It is because of this position that this constellation of relationships has implications for citizenship. These mediators undermine the prospects for democratic citizenship in two ways. They control how citizens within the favela are able to make claims on the state or other external actors, and they determine how those same external actors are able to intervene within the favela. In many cases, they act as a proxy for the state in providing a parody of services a state should provide such as access to urban services, security, and education. The militia are representative of a trend towards armed non-state actors taking over governance at the local level across Latin America (see Jones 2004; Arjona and Kalyvas 2007; Feldmann and Hinojosa 2009). Specifically within Brazil, coercive mediators are also a result of the evolution of the relationship between the state and the favela, and the emergence of the militias as a new kind of armed actor (which is also building on previously established patterns of authority). Coercive mediators in most cases undermine the principles necessary for a democratic domain: political equality, inclusion, reflexive freedom and transparency, and therefore the construction of legitimate political authority (Saward 2003). At the same time, the violence and threat of violence employed by these mediators shapes the meanings of citizenship, and mediators who use violence enable certain patterns of citizen-state interaction and limit others.

**References**


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i The descriptions of mediating actors are drawn from participatory discussion sessions, and the examples used in this chapter taken from interviews. The remaining sections of the table are my analysis.